Specialization and regional economic development by Kemeny, Thomas & Storper, Michael
SERC DISCUSSION PAPER 121
Specialization and Regional Economic Development
 Thomas Kemeny (University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill)
Michael Storper (SERC, LSE, UCLA, Sciences Po/Paris)
December 2012
This work is part of the research programme of the independent UK Spatial 
Economics Research Centre funded by a grant from the Economic and Social 
Research Council (ESRC), Department for Business, Innovation & Skills (BIS) and 
the Welsh Assembly Government. The support of the funders is acknowledged. The 
views expressed are those of the authors and do not represent the views of the funders. 
 
© T. Kemeny and M. Storper, submitted 2012 
Specialization and Regional Economic Development 
Thomas Kemeny* and Michael Storper** 
December 2012 
 
 
 
 
* University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill 
** SERC, Department of Geography & Environment, London School of Economics and 
Political Science, Department of Urban Planning, UCLA and Sciences Po/Paris 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Acknowledgements 
An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Association of American Geographers 
meeting in New York, 2012. 
Abstract 
Debates about urban growth and change often center on specialization.However, arguments 
linking specialization to metropolitan economic development contain diverse, and sometimes 
conflicting, claims. Is it better to be highly specialized or diversified? Does specialization 
refer to the absolute scale of an activity in a region, its share within the regional economy, or 
its   share   in   the   nation’s   economy?  Does   specialization   have   static   effects,   or   is   its   impact  
chiefly evolutionary? This paper starts by investigating these different theoretical claims. We 
then turn to an empirical inquiry into the roles of relative and absolute specialization. By 
analyzing local agglomerations over time, we find that growing absolute specialization is 
positively linked to wages, while changes in relative concentration are not significantly 
associated with wage dynamics. This supports notions of specialization based on the absolute 
size of an agglomeration, and casts doubt on notions of specialization based on shares of an 
activity in the regional economy.  
 
JEL Classifications: R11; R12; O21 
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1.  Introduction:  The Fascination with Specialization 
 
Discussions of urban growth and change often center on specialization.  Urban planners, 
economic development authorities, consultancies and private businesses want to know about 
the prospects of metropolitan economies, and a principal way they do this is by assigning 
some kind of causality to patterns of industrial activity in the region.  We often hear cities and 
metropolitan areas described in terms of their iconic activities, such as finance, high tech, 
logistics, services, or labor-intensive manufacturing.  And such labels carry implicit value 
judgments.  In recent years, membership in the global club of the richest metropolitan 
economies is strongly associated with regions that are centers of information technology and 
capitals of finance.  In developed countries, big manufacturing regions are in decline, in 
terms of their income rank and often in their population, while in the developing world, hubs 
of export-oriented labor-intensive manufacturing, such as Guangzhou, are said to have the 
secret to growth.  Specialization is a principal way, then, that urban economies are viewed, 
labeled and classified by practitioners and policymakers, and it defines the public imagination 
about specific cities.  
 Specialization also features prominently in academic debates over economic 
development.  Specialization and its flip side, diversification, are notions that apply to the 
tradable part of any economy; but the majority of any economy – regional or even national – 
consists of the production of non-tradable goods and services.  What the economy does in the 
tradable sector, however, has strong effects on the overall level of regional employment and 
income.  The tradable sector generates income that is spent on non-tradables in its “home 
market.”  The wages that are established in the tradable sector thus can influence wages in the 
firms and industries producing for the home market in a variety of ways.  The level of 
regional income is strongly influenced by specialization because a regional economy’s 
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external terms of trade1 are set by its tradable sector, and its overall level of output is 
influenced by tradables because demand for them is not limited by the producing region’s 
income.  A favorable specialization pattern (terms of trade and growth of external demand) is 
clearly good for the economy of the region.  Evidence for the U.S. is suggestive: the bulk of 
national income growth between 1994 and 2000 was driven by large gains in just five of the 
country’s 3,141 counties: Santa Clara, CA; San Mateo, CA, San Francisco, CA; King, WA; 
and Manhattan, NY – iconic specializations of information technology and financial services 
(Galbraith and Hale, 2004). 
 When we look more closely, however, academic arguments linking specialization to 
metropolitan economic performance contain many different, and sometimes conflicting, 
claims.  Is it better to have your regional economy be highly specialized or diversified?  Does 
specialization refer to the absolute scale of an activity in a region, its share in the overall 
regional economy, or its share in the nation’s economy?  Does specialization have positive or 
negative effects in a static way (augmenting productivity or improving the terms of trade, for 
example), or by somehow affecting the regional economy’s development over time? 
It is difficult to come by hard evidence on how levels and types of specialization 
affect employment and income.  And this is not surprising, because it is difficult to measure 
specialization in a way that captures all the dimensions referred to above, notably by 
integrating absolute and relative measures in a single index.  Moreover, there is a problem of 
aggregation or granularity: at what level should we define the activities that are similar, and 
where should we draw the borderline between activities that are different?  This is both a 
conceptual problem and a challenge given the data available to analysts.   
                                                
1 For the present purposes, “terms of trade” refers to the relative prices of the region’s output compared to the 
prices of the goods and services it imports.  If the region’s output enjoys increasing ratios of its unit prices 
relative to what it imports, then its terms of trade are said to be improving. 
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In this paper, we examine the link between specialization and economic development 
in a number of ways, in order to shed some light on these issues and make some progress in 
assessing how specialization and regional economic development might be related.  In 
sections 2 and 3 we explore how specialization gets defined in the academic and popular 
debates, and discuss how these definitions might relate to economic development.  Section 4 
illustrates how measurement issues shape our perceptions of specialization.  The core of the 
paper is an empirical test of the relationship between specialization and economic 
performance in U.S. metropolitan areas (section 5).  In Section 6 we conclude with words of 
caution about the uses of specialization in both academic and policy debates. 
 
 
2.  Specialization or Diversification? 
 
In economic development circles, it has long been debated whether it is better for an 
economy to be diversified or highly specialized (Hoover, 1948; Richardson, 1968; Quigley, 
1998; Beaudry and Schiffauerova, 2009).  We can define a diversified region as one that 
contains a wide array of unrelated sectors in its economic base, with no specific sector 
dominating.  As we shall see, translating such conceptual notions into precise empirical 
guidelines is quite complicated, but for the moment let us stick to the conceptual level.   
Three justifications have been advanced for the virtues of diversification.  The most 
common, for economic development professionals and some academics, is that 
diversification spreads the risk from economic fluctuations; this is the virtue of not putting all 
one’s eggs in the same basket.  Just as diversifying an individual’s investment portfolio 
buffers against the volatility inherent in any single company’s performance, so does the 
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diversification of regional specialization hedge against ups and downs in individual sectors 
(Attaran, 1986; Koren and Tenereyro, 2003). 
While the argument is intuitively appealing, it has two major weaknesses.  First, since 
it is principally addressed to offsetting negative shocks, it does not adequately consider 
whether being highly diversified causes an economy to forego developmental opportunities 
on the up side.  In other words, it does not consider whether diversification has opportunity 
costs, depriving an economy of benefits that could come from capturing growing sectors.To 
our knowledge, there exists no robust evidence to suggest that the effects of diversity go 
beyond volatility to determine long-term patterns of employment, whether positively or 
negatively. 
Second, the effects of diversification are likely to be sensitive to size.  For example, in 
a small, diversified economy, the collapse of demand in a single tradable sector might have a 
minor absolute effect on the local economy, but could have a large impact on non-tradables 
(decline in demand), if those are already producing at scales that are at the lower range of 
feasibility.  In a large, diversified economy, even if the collapse of demand for an activity has 
a larger absolute impact, it might affect the local non-tradable sector less, because local non-
tradables are probably operating at higher scales on average than in a small regional economy.  
Our hunch is that diversification is unlikely to have a clear independent relationship to the 
quantity or volatility of employment, and that in any case, there is great likelihood of reverse 
causality.  Moreover, this argument seems to concern the quantity of employment, rather than 
its quality.  It is hard to see how diversification would directly lead to better economic 
performance, in terms of augmenting productivity or incomes. 
A second, subtler argument for diversification holds that urbanization economies 
supply general inputs at efficient scales that are useful to many activities in a region.  
Therefore, a big metropolitan economy has reason to be diversified, and this will be reflected 
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in its average total productivity relative to smaller regions.  The major problem with this 
argument is obvious:  diversification would be an outcome, not a cause of any such 
performance benefit.  Another doubt comes from the nature of factor services supplied by 
urbanization economies:  roads, infrastructure, and such, are the most general types of input 
to a modern economy.  Beyond them, sectors need different and specific inputs (capital, labor, 
knowledge, supply chains).  Urbanization economies do not provide these at the right scale; 
localization economies do, and localization economies are a force not for diversification, but 
for specialization.   
 A third argument for diversification concerns the dynamics of the regional economy.  
The idea here would be that a modern economy is a vast and very complex social division of 
labor.  For an economy to move into, or capture, new activities, it needs to be able to draw 
quickly and easily from a shifting set of inputs and factors.  This is a kind of “mix and match” 
view of the dynamics of economic development.  A diversified economy might be able to do 
this better than a highly specialized one. 
 This is an idea that emerges repeatedly in discussions of economic development, with 
a recently prominent form touting the virtues of economic “complexity” (Hidalgo and 
Hausmann, 2009).  It also finds echoes in Jane Jacobs’ (1969) canonical pronouncements 
about the virtues of diversification.  Upon closer examination, though, it is difficult to pin 
down its precise meaning.  Do economies really develop better over time, again in terms of 
raised productivity and employment, by mixing and recombining inputs from highly 
unrelated sectors?  Or, if they develop better over time through recombination (Weitzman, 
1998), are they actually recombining inputs from sectors that are related, or at least close 
neighbors in terms of technology and underlying knowledge base?  The answer to this 
question is very sensitive to the categories used for measurement, in other words – the same 
reality can be spun as a virtue of specialization (relatedness) or diversification.   
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 Attempts to operationalize this idea in empirical terms also suffer from a serious 
endogeneity problem.  Economic geographers have recently argued that an region’s long-run 
economic prospects are sunniest when its industrial structure spans many distinct, but related 
product spaces (Frenken et al, 2007).  Unfortunately, this approach cannot tell us whether this 
situation is a cause or an outcome of being previously diversified, and thus cannot tell us 
whether it was better in the past to be specialized in order to subsequently capture a wider 
range of economic activities.  The idea that specialization leads to a more complex industrial 
structure was suggested by Gunnar Myrdal (1956), and it has been revived in the New 
Economic Geography’s core-periphery model, which demonstrates how an economy that 
starts with successful specialization gets big and diversifies as a result of its economies of 
scale in consumption (its home market).   
 Moreover, any argument about diversification-as-relatedness that leads to better 
evolution has to deal with the thorny issue of trade costs: in a world where the costs of 
linking intermediate inputs to outputs is declining, why do we need to be locally diversified, 
if we can just import what we need from afar?  Diversification would have to be useful in the 
restricted set of conditions whereby: (a) we are better off being able to mix-and-match; and 
(b), what we need to mix-and-match has to be close by, because it has high trade costs or high 
usage (know-how, experience) costs or (c), a time constraint that rules out procurement from 
far away.  This doesn’t sound like a meaningful definition of diversification as being about 
combining unrelated activities, but once again like a definition of the virtues of some kind of 
complex specialization.  We have come full circle. 
 A pragmatic place to begin evaluating the relationship between diversification and 
economic performance is to compare diversification levels among regional economies.  If 
differences in diversification are considerable, then it may be worth exploring how such 
variation relates to economic outcomes.  To get a back-of-the-envelope gauge of 
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diversification in U.S. regional economies, we take data from the U.S. Census Bureau’s 
County Business Patterns, and use it to calculate Herfindahl indices of concentration.  A 
Herfindahl index describes the extent to which a set of observations departs from a uniform 
distribution.  In this case, we describe the distribution of regional specialization in 
metropolitan areas, with values approaching zero indicating regions that are more highly 
diversified.  To provide some historical sense, we calculate such indices for 2009 as well as 
1970.  The most detailed industrial data is used in each case: four-digit Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes for 1970, and six-digit North American Industrial Classification 
System (NAICS) codes for 2009.2 
Table 1: Regional Specialization and Selected Development Indicators for Major Combined 
Statistical Areas 
 1970 2009 1970-2009 
 
Specialization 
(Herfindahl) 
Per 
Capita 
Income 
Specialization 
(Herfindahl) 
Per Capita 
Income 
Income 
CAGR 
Employment 
CAGR 
Atlanta 0.01 $3,932 0.015 $37,101 5.92 4.26 
Boston 0.008 4,430 0.015 48,831 6.35 0.89 
Chicago 0.004 4,861 0.013 43,047 5.75 0.66 
Dallas 0.009 4,167 0.014 39,811 5.96 2.67 
Houston 0.009 4,131 0.015 42,523 6.16 2.78 
Los Angeles 0.003 4,857 0.012 39,301 5.51 1.52 
New York 0.006 5,212 0.013 52,354 6.09 0.47 
Philadelphia 0.008 4,458 0.014 44,905 6.1 0.63 
San Francisco 0.008 5,265 0.015 54,062 6.15 1.44 
Washington DC 0.011 4,802 0.016 52,646 6.33 1.62 
U.S. Average 0.027 3,711 0.022 35,763 5.992 1.532 
U.S. Std.  Dev 0.03 616 0.009 5,311 0.322 0.980 
Note: Herfindahl indices produced using County Business Patterns.  Larger numbers indicate that sectoral 
employment patterns deviate from a uniform distribution.  Results are not directly comparable across years due 
to the switch in classification schemes in 1997 from SIC (4-digit) to NAICS (6-digit).  SD indicates standard 
deviation for all U.S. metropolitan areas.  Selected development indicators from the Bureau of Economic Affairs 
Regional Economic Accounts.  CAGR stands for compound annual growth rate.  Income figures are presented 
in nominal U.S. dollars.  Employment figures exclude proprietors. 
 
Table 1 presents these regional specialization metrics for major metropolitan areas, 
and complements these with selected indicators of economic development: levels and 
compound annual grow rates for per capita personal income, as well as employment growth 
rates.  The results show that specialization levels for U.S. metro areas in 1970 are distributed 
                                                
2Acknowledging all the limitations of the industrial data that we discuss in more detail below. 
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in a fairly narrow arc, both in major cities as well as the overall average across all U.S. 
consolidated statistical areas.  The largest regional economies are, of course, more diversified 
than the overall distribution of cities, but there is scant variation among large cities.  
Differences are even narrower in 2009.  And yet the economies of these cities varied widely 
in terms of income levels, and growth rates of population and income.  To take one example, 
Atlanta was the most diversified selected cities, while Los Angeles was the second most 
diversified.  Los Angeles was nearly a quarter richer than Atlanta in 1970; since that time, 
Atlanta has nearly caught to Los Angeles in terms of income levels, and its employment 
growth has dramatically outstripped that of Los Angeles.  Meanwhile, San Francisco was 
much more highly specialized in 1970; its income grew considerably faster than both 
economies, while its employment base grew slower than both.  And diversification levels in 
San Francisco, Atlanta and Los Angeles converge to quite similar levels by 2009.  Given the 
narrow spread of specialization values among metropolitan areas whose economies have 
performed quite differently, we may want to question the importance of the overall level of 
specialization or diversity as an influence on development. 
 
 
3.  Relative and Absolute Specialization 
 
Specialization is a term used to signify many different things, and its intended meaning is not 
always clearly articulated.  When making claims about specialization such as “New York is 
highly specialized in financial services,” or “Austin is ranked as the fourth most specialized 
U.S. metropolitan area in information technology,” the vast majority of reports and media 
buzz are referring to an industry’s employment share in the metropolitan economy.  This is 
what we will call “relative” specialization.  But specialization can also be thought of in 
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absolute terms: having a particular activity be the source of many jobs, or a high level of 
output, or large number of firms. 
It is impossible to simultaneously rank cities according to these two criteria.  A small 
metropolitan area whose local employment base is dominated by work in a particular activity 
would rank higher in specialization than a large metropolitan area with a low share but a 
much higher absolute level of employment or output; the same is true in reverse.  Absolute 
and relative concepts of specialization, then, provide very different images of the economy.   
In Table 2 we rank U.S. metropolitan areas according to their relative and absolute 
specializations in a particular set of activities.  For exposition, we focus on information 
technology, but any tradable sector would do.  To minimize the importance of smaller 
metropolitan areas, we present results only for metropolitan and combined statistical areas 
with a total employment base over 500,000.  The left panels of Table 2 rank regional 
economies according to the relative importance of employment in a set of 43 six-digit sectors 
that, consensus agrees, broadly cover the range of information technology activities.3  The 
right panels rank cities according to their absolute specialization in these same sectors, that is, 
on the basis of the actual number of workers they employ.  
                                                
3 This definition corresponds to those commonly used by such organizations as the Silicon Valley Index (2008), 
as well as by Saxenian (1994). 
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Table 2.  Relative and Absolute Specialization in Employment in Information Technology 
among U.S. Metropolitan (and Combined Statistical) Areas, 2010 
Metro Area Relative  Absolute 
San Francisco, CA 10% San Francisco, CA  255,334 
WashingtonDC-MD-VA-WV  8 Washington, DC-MD-VA-WV 240,721 
Seattle, WA 7 New York, NY-NJ-CT-PA 184,917 
Austin, TX 7 Los Angeles, CA  153,524 
Boston, MA-NH-ME-CT 5 Boston, MA-NH-ME-CT  122,474 
Atlanta, GA 5 Seattle, WA  90,511 
San Diego, CA 5 Dallas, TX  85,989 
Dallas, TX  4 Chicago, IL-IN-WI 82,549 
Portland, OR-WA  4 Atlanta, GA 74,566 
Denver, CO 4 Philadelphia, PA-NJ-DE-MD 52,871 
Note:  Authors’ calculations using employment data from County Business Patterns.  To filter out small 
metropolitan areas, we present results for cities with an employment base over 500,000.  For a full list of the six-
digit sectors that we define as the IT agglomeration, see Appendix A. 
 
In the relative specialization column, which also corresponds to the ranks assigned on 
the basis of location quotients, we see a list that conforms to popular IT lore.  We find San 
Francisco and Silicon Valley; Seattle, hosting Microsoft, Amazon and others; Austin, which 
has come to be known as a center for semiconductor work; the longstanding technology 
cluster in Boston.  When we shift to measures of absolute specialization, we find a 
considerably different list.  San Francisco, Washington DC, Seattle and Boston remain, but 
certain large metropolitan areas emerge as highly-ranked centers of employment in 
information technology: New York, Los Angeles, Chicago, and Philadelphia.  The case of 
Los Angeles is instructive.  Southern California hosts a large agglomeration of information 
technology, centered on Orange County.  It is one of the nation’s largest in absolute terms.  
Yet Los Angeles appears nowhere in the higher echelons of relative specialization (it ranks 
31st among all metropolitan areas on this basis), and its location quotient is low.  Although it 
is the fourth largest agglomeration in the U.S. – making it larger than those of celebrated 
clusters in Boston and Seattle – the hub of information technology concentrated in the Los 
Angeles region is rarely mentioned in discussions of U.S. high technology centers.  The 
public debate, implicitly centered on relative, not absolute specialization, throws big shadows 
over this complex reality. 
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Of these two measures, however, the clearest theoretical case exists for specialization 
defined in absolute terms.  Increasing the size of a localized activity agglomeration should 
raise the productivity effects of spatial concentration through the three main mechanisms 
specified by theory: sharing of input suppliers; matching of specialized labor demand and 
labor supply, especially in a context of high-turnover industries; and technological learning or 
spillovers, especially where innovation involves many different types of actors spread across 
different organizations (Duranton and Puga, 2004; Rosenthal and Strange, 2004). 
By contrast, there is less theoretical clarity and consensus for why having a high share 
of an activity would improve economic performance.  Over the years, three principal notions 
have been developed that suggest that growing relative specialization will produce economic 
benefits.  The first concerns competition between sectors for resources in the regional 
economy.  Consider a regional economy with a sector that has a high share of regional 
employment and output.  Due to this footprint, the agglomeration will exercise a dominant 
role in regional demand for labor, land, infrastructure and other resources.  If we further 
assume that regional factor supplies and infrastructure are not perfectly supply elastic, or 
even that they have strong frictions, then a high level of relative specialization would 
minimize certain kinds of congestion effects that might appear in a more diversified regional 
economy.  This might result in productivity levels that are positively related to relative 
specialization. 
This is descriptively plausible.  Firms in any given industry might prefer not to have 
competition from other sectors if this minimizes their production costs in a region.  But the 
region might very well prefer to develop other activities, even if they raise competition for 
factors and resources and ultimately drive out the dominant sector.  From the perspective of 
the region this may be preferable if this diversification of its economic base entails movement 
up the ladder of technological sophistication and productivity.  Standard theory would always 
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prefer the latter outcome and would predict it, using standard assumptions about factor 
mobility and local economic succession.  Empirically, regions fare very differently when 
faced with this kind of complex problem of local economic adjustment.  Some succeed in 
moving onward and upward, while others enter into a vicious circle of loss of employment 
and population.  The problem is that there seems to be no general model that explains how 
relative specialization, by minimizing resource competition, would be systematically good or 
bad for regional economic development.  Thus, upon closer examination, it does not provide 
much justification for the benefits of a narrow regional economic base. 
A second variant of the relative specialization hypothesis is an institutional version of 
the first.  Chinitz (1961) once proposed that dominant industries command the political 
attention of the region in which they are located, and that this complements the way they can 
quasi-monopsonize factor markets, as in the discussion above.  Contrasting New York and 
Pittsburgh, Chinitz suggested that the outcomes of this could be favorable if the industry is a 
promising or dynamic one, while it can be negative if it is not.  Subsequently, Mancur Olson 
(1965) developed a more general theory of how interest groups capture attention, leading to 
“institutional sclerosis,” whereby the ability of institutions to reallocate resources to new 
domains of activity and functioning is diminished.  Thus, if we borrow from Chinitz’s 
positive example, it follows that some forms of relative specialization could be helpful to a 
regional economy via the way they create dynamic industry groups, but if we borrow from 
his less positive example or more generally from the Olson hypothesis, relative specialization 
leads to elite capture and sclerosis.   
These are obviously interesting and plausible theoretical notions.  In political science, 
they have been tested in a number of policy-making areas, and are a major theme in large-
scale institutional theory as applied to long-term processes of national economic development  
(Persson and Tabellini, 2002; Grossman and Helpman, 2002; Acemoglu et al, 2001; 
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Acemoglu and Robinson, 2008).  To our knowledge, however, there has been no large-scale 
test of whether high levels of relative specialization lead to these political-economic effects at 
the regional scale, and in turn whether such effects shape long-term adjustment of regional 
economies in a positive or negative way. 
A third version of the relative specialization hypothesis can be drawn from recent 
debates in economic geography and what is known as the “new regionalism.”  These 
discussions draw on theories of agglomeration.  They explore the idea that an agglomeration 
of producers is simultaneously an interacting supply system; a local labor market matching 
system; and a context for knowledge exchange and spillover.  But it is more than the sum of 
these parts:  it is also a functioning ecosystem, tied together by many kinds of specialized 
economic agents, such as “dealmakers,” supportive local governments and associations, 
habits and soft conventions, and supportive inputs such as finance, and R&D (Storper 1997; 
Morgan, 1997; Feldman and Zoller, 2012).  It stands to reason that there is just so much room 
for these ecosystems in any given region, even in very big ones.  This third hypothesis about 
relative specialization would then be that if a region wants to have these highly-performing 
ecosystems, it cannot accommodate too many of them.   
No discussion of relative specialization would be complete without mentioning a 
long-standing version of it: the idea that a region is relatively specialized when an industry 
has a higher share in the regional economy than it does in the national economy.  This 
concept, canonized in the location quotient, is an indicator in search of a theory.  The 
strongest theory one can adduce in its support is the notion that there is a fixed external 
(national or international) demand for the output of a sector, so that if a region is specialized 
in a sector with external demand that increases faster than the regional demand, then the 
specialization will be favorable to regional growth.  But it can readily be seen that it offers no 
general predictions about whether a high location quotient will be good or bad for regional 
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income or employment; that depends entirely on whether one specializes in a sector with high 
external growth or not.  Evidently, this could go either way. 
Table 3 summarizes our discussion of the various theories regarding the economic 
development implications of specialization, and evaluates the arguments on the basis of 
theoretical grounds as well as the evidentiary basis for each. 
Table 3: Typology of theories of the development effects of specialization  
SPECIALIZATION Type ARGUMENT SOLID ARGUMENT? EVIDENCE 
IA. Overall level of 
specialization / 
diversification 
Spreads risk from 
external shocks 
- Addresses shocks, not 
opportunities 
- Urbanization 
economies do not 
enhance 
diversification 
- Main benefit is from 
size not diversification 
per se 
No hard evidence 
that diversification 
raises long-run 
regional 
employment levels 
or quality  
IB. Overall level Dynamic version: 
relatedness through 
diversification 
helps evolution 
Is it diversity or 
complex “related” 
specialization? 
Evidentiary claims 
extremely sensitive 
to definition of 
“related”.  No 
consensus about 
this. 
IIA. Relative (share) 
specialization 
Reduces 
competition for 
factors/congestion 
costs 
Not clear why would be 
good for regional 
economy as whole 
 
IIB. Relative (share) 
specialization) 
Focuses political-
elite attention 
Chinitz hypothesis 
supported by 
institutionalist literature 
- Difficult to test at 
any scale 
- No large-sample 
tests at regional 
scale 
IIC. Relative (share) 
specialization 
New regionalism  Not just industries, but 
their supporting 
environments, 
ecosystems 
Case studies 
suggest this, but 
lots of conceptual 
imprecision.  No 
large-scale tests.   
III. Absolute specialization 
(size of cluster) 
Scale leads to 
greater 
productivity 
- Theory on sharing, 
matching, learning = 
at least the first two 
strongly scale 
dependent; third 
should have positive 
scale effect through 
specialization and 
diversity of knowledge 
community 
Some confirming 
evidence in urban 
economics 
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4.  Measurement:  What Goes Together and Comes Apart? 
 
In order to investigate these concerns empirically, we have to be able to measure 
specialization.  Specialization should include activities that are similar or closely related, and 
the term diversification should refer to an economy based on activities that are heterogeneous 
or unrelated.  Operationalizing these notions of “similar” or “related” (or their opposites) is 
not easy.  Theory instructs us to look for functional inter-relatedness in terms of input-output 
relationships among localized firms.  Measures of relatedness should capture not only the 
links among buyers and suppliers, but also connections that arise through shared labor pools 
and common ideas.  Moreover, we would also like to capture the ecosystemic aspects of 
specialization described above: networks, conventions, dealmakers, etc.  Unfortunately, these 
requirements are too onerous to be practical; they constitute ideals against which we should 
measure the possible. 
The standard statistical categories for capturing specialization are supposed to group 
together activities that have similar outputs, and by virtue of this, would be based on similar 
production techniques and factor inputs.  In the United States, this is the idea behind the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC), and more recently, the North American Industrial 
Classification System (NAICS).  But different levels of similarity will be captured by the 
scale of aggregation of the NAICS category used to perform the empirics of specialization, 
ranging from the highly-aggregated one-digit level that distinguishes manufacturing from 
wholesale activities and so on, to far more detailed six-digit industries.   
This choice of aggregation or “granularity” is vitally important.  The typical 
consulting report and many academic articles employ two- or three-digit NAICS codes.  
These aggregate together disparate activities that are unlikely to be functionally related or 
similar to one another.  For instance, three-digit NAICS codes group together graphic design, 
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tax preparation and the design of computer systems.  It is not plausible that these activities 
regularly constitute part of a coherent specialization.  Two- and three-digit industry codes 
therefore create groups that contain high levels of internal heterogeneity.  Homogeneous 
commodity industries, or those that have a simple and unified technological base (and hence 
production function) across a variety of outputs, are very rare.  Studies of specialization using 
highly aggregate classifications will generate rankings that are highly questionable.   
If high levels of aggregation lump together activities that are substantially different in 
their effects on employment and income, then statements about them reflect invidious 
comparisons.  This point can be seen in Table 4, where we compare wages associated with 
specialization in the aggregate category of information technology in Los Angeles and San 
Francisco.  Both regions have large absolute concentrations of high technology, as noted 
above, but the San Francisco Bay Area has a much higher level of relative specialization.  
However, the wages that workers earn in information technology activities in Southern 
California are considerably lower than in Northern California.  On average, information 
technology workers in Los Angeles earn a bit less than 70 percent of their colleagues in the 
Bay Area.  One sensible interpretation is that, in fact, we are comparing apples and oranges:  
the San Francisco area is likely specialized in different subsectors (products or functions) of 
high tech than its southern neighbor.   
Table 4: Average Wages in Information Technology Sectors 2010 
 
Sectors 
Average 
Wages: 
Los Angeles 
Average 
Wages: 
San Francisco 
Overall IT Agglomeration   
Information Technology Agglomeration (43 6-digit sectors) $86,169 $128,216 
   
Selected Individual 6-digit Sectors   
Software publishers (511210) $128,583 $169,432 
Custom Computer Programming Services(541511) 89,295 111,648 
Computer System Design Services (541512) 90,874 111,312 
Computer Equipment and Software Merchant Wholesalers (423430) 80,416 155,961 
Note:  Authors' calculations based on data from County Business Patterns.  Wages are averages expressed in 
nominal 2010 dollars.  For a full list of the sectors that are part of the IT agglomeration, see Appendix A. 
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Even when we disaggregate, the differences persist.  The lower part of Table 3 
compares wages across Los Angeles and San Francisco within individual, six-digit 
information technology sectors - the most detailed industrial data commonly available.  To 
ensure we are not examining small outliers, we confine our results to sectors in which both 
regions are highly specialized.  For instance, San Francisco software workers earn around 30 
percent more than workers in the same narrow sector in Los Angeles.  Wage differences 
could reflect differences in productivity within a subsector, but it seems more likely that SF is 
producing different outputs, using different techniques and factor inputs, from LA.  
Aggregation masks this heterogeneity, which has been amply confirmed in studies on 
international trade and technological upgrading.  Researchers have found considerable 
international variation in sophistication even using 10-digit product-level data (Schott, 2005; 
Kemeny, 2011).  Further disaggregation is therefore not a practical solution to this problem 
because there is so much unobserved heterogeneity in the economy.  But this ought to raise 
flags about any statement about specialization, and confirms our suspicion that most of the 
academic and policy literature about specialization is comparing apples and oranges.  To 
make things more complex still, dangers are not limited to insufficient detail – there may also 
be such a thing as too much disaggregation.  To take an example, it seems sensible to jointly 
consider changes in specialization in such six-digit NAICS sectors as  “Custom Computer 
Programming Services (541511) and “Computer Systems Design” (541512).  Yet, if we 
address the issue of internal heterogeneity by defining industries using the greatest industrial 
detail, we arrive at another problem: we have now considered that each six-digit sector ought 
to exist within an entirely isolated silo, with no relationships to other six-digit industries. 
It seems then, that an improved approach would seek to combine detailed sectoral 
data into larger groupings reflecting substantive interconnections.  We followed this course 
when compared IT in California regions in Table 3, curating a list of relevant six-digit sectors 
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from various classes.  For instance, our list included “Semiconductor and Related Device 
Manufacturing,” (334413) and “Computer System Design Services” (541512), despite the 
fact that, on the basis of their location in the classification system, these ought to be unrelated 
or highly dissimilar industries.  But these sectors are actually closely related, and this is 
reflected in their high level of geographical co-location.   
This ad hoc approach does not solve the problem of internal heterogeneity, but it 
helps us combine detailed industry data into something that better resembles our 
understanding of specialization, in information technology at least.  Ultimately, we need an 
algorithmic method of performing these tasks for the entire economy.  Economic geographers 
and urban economists have sought an approach to address this problem of ‘industrial 
distance’ (Ellison and Glaeser, 1997; Frenken et al, 2007; Boschma and Iammarino, 2009).  
Though a research agenda is solidifying around this problem, as yet there is no widely agreed 
upon method for distinguishing related from unrelated segments of the economy.  This is an 
urgent problem whose solution could potentially improve our understanding of specialization.   
Given the present state of affairs, however, statements about specialization – 
descriptive or statistical – should be interpreted with great prudence and “league table” or 
rankings of hot spots should be taken with more than a grain of salt.   
 
 
5.  Specialization and Development: A Test of Specialization Effects on 
Incomes 
 
 Having discussed the theoretical case for specialization, and explored the difficulties 
of its measurement, we now investigate the relationship between economic development and 
specialization empirically.  For this exercise, we focus on one aspect of the broader 
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discussion above: exploring the links between productivity and relative and absolute 
specialization.  Specialization, whether relative or absolute, may certainly affect other 
dimensions of development, such as population or employment growth, but we are most 
interested in its relationship to the ‘quality’ of growth.  Like much of the literature, we 
measure productivity using data on wages.  Wages are the best available gauge of worker 
productivity (Feldstein, 2008).  And in the context of cities, evidence suggests that rising 
worker productivity is expressed in higher wage levels (Combes at al, 2005).  Wage data, as 
compared with output data from the Census of Manufactures, is also less likely to introduce 
bias due to mis-measurement (Ciccone and Hall, 1996).   
A standard approach in the agglomeration literature links productivity to the relative 
or absolute size of a sector (and sometimes a city).  This approach predicts the wages of 
individual workers, as follows, 
 
wijk =α +β1Sjk +β2 !Xi +β3 !Ck +εi  (1) 
 
where w represents wages for individual i in industry j and city k; S indicates some index of 
industry specialization or agglomeration; X’ describes a vector of individual characteristics, 
such as educational attainment, experience, gender etc., C’ is a vector of city-specific 
characteristics; and ε is an error term satisfying classical regression properties.  Estimates of 
Equation 1 commonly use ordinary least squares (OLS) on large cross-sectional data like 
public-use samples of the Decennial Census of Population and Housing (for some prominent 
examples, see Wheaton and Lewis, 2002 and Glaeser and Maré, 2001).  This method offers 
some advantages, not least that such data cover large numbers of individuals.   
 However, this approach suffers from at least two major issues.  The largest and most 
widely discussed problem is that of bias due to unobserved heterogeneity.  While the 
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available large, individual-level datasets commonly include a variety of wage covariates, they 
do not cover the full breadth of worker differences.  Bias from this source could be very 
large; for instance, Yankow (2006) finds that two-thirds of the city-size wage premium is due 
to unobserved worker differences.  Variation in wages could be due to specialization or they 
could instead reflect unobserved differences in worker ability or effort. 
 A second issue arises from the dearth of data on individuals over time that could be 
used in order to track the co-movement of specialization and wages.  At its heart, any theory 
about the links between specialization and economic outcomes is about how changes in 
specialization patterns might produce changed economic circumstances.  Unfortunately, such 
rich linked time-series data do not exist for the U.S. (nor for most other countries).4  Cross-
sectional worker data simply do not allow us to shed light on dynamics. 
One sensible compromise would be to use data offering repeated measures on 
industries in regional economies.  Following this more feasible approach, we adopt the 
following model, 
 
wjkt = β1wjkt−1 +β2ASjkt +β3RSjkt +β4 "N jk +β5 "Ck +µ jk +ηt +υ jt  (2) 
 
where w  is the average wage for workers in industry j in city k at time t; AS measures the 
level of absolute specialization for an agglomeration(industry x city); RS is the level of 
relative specialization for a given industry x city; N’ is a vector of time-varying industry x city 
characteristics; C’is a vector of dynamic city-level characteristics; µ represents an individual 
industry x city fixed effect; η represents a year fixed effect, and ν is the standard error term.  
Equation 2 also adds a one-period lag of the average wages in an agglomeration, since 
                                                
4 The Census Bureau’s Longitudinal Employer-Household Dynamics (LEHD) is the closest data of this kind for 
the U.S., though it offers very scant establishment information. Access to such data are also somewhat out of 
reach: access is restricted to approved researchers, with approval often taking very lengthy periods. 
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workers’ wage levels are not set anew each year, but are instead anchored by the wages 
earned in the previous period.  Just as an individual’s wage is not annually renegotiated from 
a blank slate, average industry x city wages in the current year should be related to average 
wage levels from the prior year.5 
Equation 2 explores how productivity levels in an agglomeration respond to changes 
in its relative and absolute levels of specialization.  Taking a concrete example, our approach 
seeks to identify how the wages of workers in New York City’s financial services sector are 
influenced by changes in this agglomeration’s absolute size and relative footprint in the 
region.  The industry x city fixed effect absorbs all stationary heterogeneity across 
agglomerations.  That is, it addresses the problem of comparing apples and oranges that 
plague cross-sectional explorations, whether those apples and oranges are individual workers 
or local agglomerations.  Meanwhile, the year dummy variable accounts for unobserved time-
specific shocks that exert uniform impacts across all industry x city units, such as business 
cycles.  Equation 2 therefore offers a number of advantages over  estimates of the impact of 
specialization on wages produced using the more common specification shown in Equation 1.  
First, Equation 2 accounts for a wide array of sources of spurious correlation, not least the 
problem of comparing apples and oranges.  It also exploits temporal dimensions of the data.  
Moreover, by confining the studied relationship to within-sector effects, we avoid having to 
consider an almost-unlimited number of other possible causes of inter-sectoral wage spillover 
effects.  For these reasons, it ought to provide an improved gauge of the association between 
specialization and productivity.   
 
 
                                                
5 Including lagged dependent variables as predictors can be a tricky procedure, with the possibility that such 
variables will (incorrectly) swamp the effects of other predictors of interest. We discuss this and methods of 
correcting for such problems further in the results section, but this problem does not afflict the results of this 
empirical inquiry.   
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5.1 Data 
To estimate Equation 2, we use the U.S. Census Bureau’s County Business Patterns dataset.  
County Business Patterns provides annual information about industries in individual counties.  
The data offer a number of key advantages.  First, they are comprehensive: they provide 
details of every industry in each county in the U.S.  Second, because they are an annual series, 
they can be assembled and analyzed as a panel dataset.  Third, they offer detailed industrial 
granularity, with industries defined at the 6-digit North American Industrial Classification 
System (NAICS) level after 1997.  Fourth, they are released in a relatively timely manner, 
such that our analytical data run from the incorporation of the NAICS system in 1998, all the 
way up to 2010. 
 The data are not, however, without their own issues.  They describe a small range of 
characteristics of regional agglomerations, chiefly payroll, employment and information 
about the number and size distribution of firms.6Moreover, their high degree of geographic 
and industrial detail means that it is difficult to supplement the minimal data with other 
information from external sources, since these supplementary data can scarcely match their 
granularity.  Such a small range of variables would be highly problematic in cross-sectional 
studies.  However, using fixed effects, any stationary differences among industrial clusters 
are irrelevant to the analysis.  This approach may not suit all research questions, but it is apt 
for an investigation into the responsiveness of productivity to changes in specialization. 
 The ‘regions’ to be studied are Metropolitan Areas, as defined by the Office of 
Management and Budget (OMB).  OMB defines metropolitan areas to reflect functional 
social and economic integration as determined by commuting ties.  County Business Patterns 
includes information on 292 metropolitan areas.  The dependent variable in the forgoing 
analysis is the average annual wage income for workers in each industry x city agglomeration, 
                                                
6 There are also some issues with employment data that is suppressed due to reasons of confidentiality 
(Issserman and Westervelt, 2006), though this may not be true in more recent samples. 
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derived by dividing total annual payroll in an agglomeration by the number of its employees.  
We measure absolute specialization as the number of employees in a local agglomeration.  
We calculate relative specialization as the share of employment in a local agglomeration in 
total metropolitan employment.  As controls, we include total metropolitan employment.  
This indicates the breadth of overall agglomeration economies, which may be related to 
wages and productivity.  Prior research also suggests that its absence may bias estimates 
using measures of relative specialization (Combes, 2000).  Because of evidence indicating 
that industry productivity is partly a function of the distribution of the sizes of its constituent 
firms (Acs et al, 1999, Pagano and Schivardi, 2003), we also include an indicator of average 
industry firm size. 
 We define local agglomerations using four-digit NAICS sectors.  Equation 2 seeks to 
examine how changes in the size of a localized industry affect the wages it pays.  As noted 
earlier, if the boundaries of an industry are defined too narrowly, then we will ignore changes 
in specialization in related sectors.  Conversely, if industry definitions are too broad, then 
changes in employment will include many activities that will have little effect on the wages 
of our ‘true’ sector’s workers.  There is therefore a need to strike a balance in terms of the 
level of industrial granularity.  We opt for 4-digit industries because they seem to offer this 
balance, though we conduct sensitivity analysis at different levels to ensure our findings are 
not purely the result of our chosen level of industrial detail. 
 Rather than estimating the impact of changes in specialization in the full range of 
industrial sectors that compose the broader economy, we discriminate among industry types.  
Agglomeration studies have focused mainly on manufacturing, and in some cases on services.  
We focus on tradable sectors for the reasons discussed in previous sections.   
 Following Jensen and Kletzer (2006), we identify tradables by looking at patterns of 
geographical concentration.  It is assumed that tradable industries are concentrated in 
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relatively few locations in the U.S., while spatially ubiquitous sectors are non-tradables.  
Using County Business Patterns data for 2010, the following Herfindahl index of 
geographical concentration is constructed for each four-digit sector:7 
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where e measures employment in industry j and city k; and E is total employment across all 
cities in industry j.  Industries with Herfindahl values near zero will be those that exhibit a 
uniform distribution over space, while Herfindahl values closer to one indicate sectors where 
activity is highly concentrated in only a few locations. 
 As with Jensen and Kletzer, we must choose a cutoff point in the distribution of 
concentration values at which tradable activities are distinguished from non-tradables.  There 
is no clear theoretical guidance on such a cutoff.  By closely examining the data, we settle on 
a cutoff point of around 0.036.  Industries with Herfindahl values below 0.036 conform to our 
expectations regarding industries that ought to be non-tradable:  retail stores of various kinds, 
death care services, car repair, warehousing, architectural services, machine shops and other 
general purpose machinery manufacturing.  Meanwhile, industries with index values above 
0.036 seem likely to be tradable.  These include motor vehicle parts manufacturing, software 
publishing, electric lighting equipment manufacturing, and pipeline transportation of crude 
oil.  While the precise location of this cutoff is not derived from theory, in empirical terms it 
sensibly differentiates non-tradable from tradable sectors.   
 
                                                
7 Though Jensen and Kletzer use locational Gini coefficients, the Herfindahl index made more sense to us, 
because it is explicitly about concentration – another way to say specialization. See Wolfson (1997) for a 
comparison of the two measures. We explored the sensitivity of results to the choice of alternate years, including 
2000 and 2005. Results did not materially vary. 
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5.2 Results 
Initial results reported in Table 5 are estimated using pooled ordinary least squares.  We start 
from this naïve approach for exposition purposes.  The final model uses a different estimation 
technique and represents our best estimate of the relationships of interest.  Year fixed effects 
are included in all models in order to account for economy-wide time-specific shocks.89 
 Model 1 estimates a simplified version of Equation 2 in which relative specialization 
is the sole specialization measure; Model 2 does the same using only absolute specialization.  
Relative and absolute specialization are related by construct ion, though they are only 
moderately correlated (corr=0.34, p=0.000).  This is because overall employment levels, 
which form the denominator of the relative specialization measure, are influenced by a host 
of factors unrelated to the dynamics of individual industrial clusters.  Diagnostics performed 
on OLS estimates, such as the variance inflation factor (VIF) test, indicate no problems of 
multi-collinearity among these or other variables.  Nonetheless, our initial two models focus 
on each specialization measure separately.  In pooled cross-sectional models, both measures 
are positively and significantly related to average wages when they alone indicate 
specialization.  We can interpret Model 1 as indicating that industries that occupy larger 
shares of their regional economy also pay higher wages, while Model 2 suggests that large 
industries in cities tend to pay higher wages.  In Model 3 we include both aspects of 
specialization at once.  Though magnitudes of the coefficients for each specialization 
measure decline somewhat, both remain positively and significantly related to average 
industry x city wages.  Hence a naïve interpretation of these results would say that New 
                                                
8 In initial exploration, city and industry dummy variables were also included. These would account for the 
effect of any stationary city-wide or industry-wide shocks. Since these did not materially change the results for 
the variables of interest, we do not report these here. These dummies also got unwieldy in the more complex 
approaches that follow. 
9 While it is common for researchers to log transform some variables, especially wages, we opt against this 
approach, choosing to leave variables in their natural scale. We do so mainly because of the size of our dataset. 
While non-normality of predictors can indicate potential problems of non-normality of the residuals, this issue is 
not likely to bias estimates produced using a dataset with so many observations. In most cases, logging did not 
materially affect results. 
26 
 
York’s finance workers earn more than their counterparts in Los Angeles both because Wall 
Street employs more workers, and because it agglomeration occupies a larger share of overall 
employment in New York than the same industry does in Los Angeles. 
 However, these preliminary results ignore four important econometric considerations.  
First, as we discuss above, for the purposes of identification, it makes sense to utilize 
repeated observations on industry x city units.  The OLS models pool together all industry x 
city x time observations, but do not recognize the temporal relationships within industry x city 
units.  By exploiting the time dimension, we can incorporate dynamics while permitting fixed 
effects estimation that shifts the examined relationship to one occurring within groups.  
Taking a fixed effects approach, we can model how wages in a particular local agglomeration 
change in response to changes in specialization over time in that unit. 
 Second, given the likelihood that average wages depend on past realizations, it is 
desirable to include a lagged iteration of average wages on the right side of the equation.  In 
the context of the OLS models (1) – (3), we opted not to do so given well-documented issues 
of bias in that context (Achen, 2000; Keele and Kelly, 2006).  Even in a panel setup, dynamic 
pane bias is a widely discussed problem.  The standard solution is to apply some form of the 
Generalized Method of Moments (GMM) estimator (Bond, 2002; Arellano and Honore, 
2001).  In addition to being apt in the presence of an autoregressive dependent variable, this 
class of model is also suitable for large-N, small-T panels such as the one at hand.  For this 
reason, rather than applying the standard fixed effects estimator to equation (2), we estimate 
the model using two-step GMM-FE. 
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Table 5.  Estimates of dynamic relationship between specialization and wages, 1998-2010 
Dependent Variable: Average Industry x Region Annual Wage 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 OLS OLS OLS GMM-FE IV 
VARIABLES    BW(2) 
Relative Specialization 3,839*** 
(109.8) 
 1,953*** 
(126.5) 
-265.5 
(649.6) 
Absolute Specialization  0.597*** 
(0.009) 
0.486*** 
(0.010) 
0.279*** 
(0.081) 
Lagged Average Wages 
 
   0.233*** 
(0.033) 
Metro employment(thousands) 2.025*** 
(0.028) 
1.272*** 
(0.031) 
1.425*** 
(0.032) 
4.48*** 
(0.783) 
Average Firm Size   0.683 
(0.797) 
-28.48*** 
(4.968) 
Constant 27,499*** 
(151.2) 
28,248*** 
(203.7) 
27,764*** 
(150.8) 
 
Observations 114,155 114,155 114,155 72,923 
Groups    17,160 
Year Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared    0.17 
First-stage F-statistic    91.14 
Hanson J Statistic    1.044 
(Chi-square p-value)    (0.307) 
Note: Asterisks indicate significance levels:*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.  Models 1-3 estimated with 
heteroscedasticity-robust standard errors.  Model 4 estimated using two-step robust GMM with HAC standard 
errors produced with a 2 year bandwidth. 
Endogeneity, and specifically bias from reverse causation represents a third potential 
estimation issue.  While theory predicts a causal relationship running from specialization to 
productivity, it is sensible that rising wages and productivity could stimulate changes in 
specialization.  Employment in sectors with rising wages may grow in absolute and relative 
terms as workers shift from other locations, as well as from other industries in the same city.  
Both indicators of specialization are potentially endogenous in this regard.  Lacking ready 
access to randomized control trials, we attempt to account for endogeneity using instrumental 
variables techniques.  As always, the problem of finding suitable instruments looms large.  
GMM techniques are useful in this respect, as they provide methods of incorporating lagged 
regressors as instruments.  We avail ourselves of this strategy, but also add an additional 
‘substantive’ instrument for absolute specialization, adapting a shift-share approach that Card 
(2001) applies in the context of the economic effects of immigration.  We calculate the 
‘predicted’ size of employment in a region’s industry in time t on the basis of its size in 
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period t-1 and the overall national industry growth rate between t-1 and t.  Industry-specific 
national historical employment growth rates are given by: 
 
gjt−(t−1) =
ej
E
"
#
$
%
&
'
t
−
ej
E
"
#
$
%
&
'
t−1
(
)
*
+
,
-
ej
E
"
#
$
%
&
'
t−1
 
(4) 
 
where gjis the growth rate in employment e for industry jin the national economy with a total 
employment of E between t and t-1.  Given these growth rates, the shift-share ‘predicted 
absolute specialization’ index AS is constructed as follows: 
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Since current wages can determine neither prior levels of employment in a local 
agglomeration, nor historical national industry employment growth, this index is a potentially 
useful exogenous source of variation.  Its appropriateness as an instrument will be discussed 
below. 
 Serial autocorrelation represents a fourth and final estimation problem, one which 
could bias standard errors.  We detect the presence of serial autocorrelation in the panel data 
using a test created by Wooldridge (2002).10  We apply the standard Newey-West approach 
that uses the Bartlett kernel to produce heteroscedasticity- and autocorrelation-consistent 
(HAC) estimates.  In initial work, we explored bandwidths from 2 to 5 and found consistent 
results in each case.For brevity, we present findings estimated with a bandwidth of 2. 
 Model 4 addresses these four econometric concerns; it is fixed effects model with 
lagged as well as substantive instruments for potentially endogenous regressors, estimated 
using two-step GMM with HAC covariance estimation with a bandwidth of 2.  Together, 
                                                
10 We conduct Wooldridge’s test using the Stata command ‘xtserial’. 
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these methodological choices ought to produce efficient estimates of the coefficients and 
standard errors, while strengthening confidence on the direction of causality in the observed 
relationship, while also accounting for dynamic panel bias and serial autocorrelation.  We 
estimate the model on over 20,000 local industry x city agglomerations.  Due to the shift in 
estimation strategy from OLS to FE, the magnitudes of coefficients in Model 4 are 
substantially different from those obtained in Models 1–3.   
 Model 4 more conclusively demonstrates that absolute specialization is positively and 
significantly related to wages.  The coefficient on this variable suggests that, as employment 
in a local agglomeration grows by 100 workers, average annual wages in that cluster will rise 
by around $29.  This seems fairly modest, but it is worth considering that this effect is larger 
than the overall urban agglomeration effect: with a coefficient of 4.32, a similar increase in 
urban population will augment wages by only $0.43.  Interestingly, after accounting for the 
temporal dimension of the data, relative specialization is negatively related to wages, though 
insignificant.  In fact, over a very wide variety of fixed-effects estimates, ranging from those 
with no instruments and lagged dependent variables to fuller models with all of the 
characteristics accounted for in Model 4, absolute specialization is uniformly positive and 
significant, while relative specialization is uniformly negative (and mostly insignificant).  
This holds not only for four-digit industrial data, but also for panels constructed using two-, 
three-, five- and six-digit data.  The striking differences between cross-sectional and panel 
results points to the need to carefully revisit the findings of prior studies that do not explore 
temporal dynamics. 
 The lower panel of Table 5 displays diagnostics of the instrumental variables.  
Specifically, the first-stage F statistic is far above the threshold value of 13.43, suggesting 
that we can conclude that our instrument set is not weak.  The Hansen J value indicates that 
at least one of our instruments can plausibly be treated as endogenous.  These results increase 
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the confidence with which we can consider that the direction of the observed relationship 
goes from specialization to wages and not the other way around. 
 
 
6.  Conclusion:  Specialization and the Dynamics of Economic Development  
 
In keeping with theories of agglomeration central to the field of economic geography, we find 
that growing absolute specialization is linked to rising wages, while changes in relative 
concentration are not significantly associated with wage dynamics.  These theories hold that 
scale augments productivity chiefly through sharing, matching and learning.  However, the 
insignificant relationship between relative specialization and wages stands in contrast to 
results obtained using cross-sectional, between-industry approaches, probably because our 
method eliminated a lot of the noise (unobserved heterogeneity) in those approaches. 
 Our empirical exercise leaves unexplored many other potential dimensions of the 
relationship between specialization and regional economic development.  One such 
dimension is the link between incomes and the type, rather than the level, of specialization.  
New Yorkers might be richer on a per capita basis than Angelenos because NY has high 
relative and absolute specialization in finance and business services, which are very high 
wage sectors.  We have only confirmed that as finance grows bigger in absolute terms, New 
Yorkers working in that sector will see their wages rise.  Research at the international scale 
confirms that countries with tradable sectors positioned near the top of the global ladder of 
product sophistication and quality do indeed have higher incomes than those chiefly oriented 
toward activities occupying the lower rungs (Kemeny, 2011; Hausmann et al, 2007).  Applied 
to metropolitan regions, this reasoning suggests that specialization is related to development 
not so much through a general effect of overall levels of specialization, whether absolute or 
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relative, as through the ‘what’ of specialization.  The region’s position in the economy-wide 
division of labor matters most to regional wages and per capita incomes, through its effect on 
terms of trade and production technique, which act upon factor composition and prices. 
 Of course, in smaller regional economies, it follows that devoting greater effort to a 
more sophisticated activity will enhance the favorable effect of that specialization on the 
regional economy.  This will mechanically raise levels of absolute and relative specialization 
in the favorable sector, and unleash the productivity effect that we detect above.  The 
combined effects of ‘doing the right thing’ and doing so at a larger absolute scale, will move 
wages and incomes in the same positive direction.  Inversely, an economy positioned far 
down on quality and innovation ladders is unlikely to resolve its income level problem by 
simply by increasing the scale – relative or absolute – of its agglomeration. 
 The most significant dimension of specialization, then, is the classical meaning of the 
term, i.e.  concerning not the scale but the ‘what.’ This issue is dealt with in development 
theory through the notion of comparative advantage; in economic geography it features in 
theories that account for the locational sorting of tradable activities between regions, on the 
basis of the combination of trade costs and agglomeration economies, as well as the evolution 
of sectors within places. 
In the background of any consideration of the dynamics of specialization in an open 
global economy is the issue of the complex relationship between forces for regional 
convergence and divergence.  Why do some city-regions fall down the income rankings 
(Cleveland, Detroit), while others climb up (Houston, Dallas), and still others manage to 
maintain their positions at the top while transitioning their tradable sectors (San Francisco, 
Boston), and still others climb up a bit and then stagnate in the middle of the ladder (Las 
Vegas, Phoenix)? This evidently, though not entirely, has to do with the shifting industrial 
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makeup of these places.  In that process, change in specialization is not an entirely exogenous 
cause – it is partly an outcome – but it plays an important role. 
 Along these lines, some of the relative specialization hypotheses we discussed in 
section 3, but which we did not test in this paper, make claims about possible favorable 
effects of good relative specialization at t leading to good (or better) specialization at t+n.  
Notice that these hypotheses are not about maintaining or growing the same favorable 
specialization over time, but about a process of succession by which specializations 
dynamically affect one another over time and space.  There is little in the empirical literature 
that tests this rigorously.11  The treatment of this very important issue remains largely 
qualitative and anecdotal.  It reframes the specialization debate as one about development, 
but we are far from having the theory or measurement techniques adequate to this task.  This 
debate raises the bar for evolutionary theories of the benefits of relatedness and for 
institutional theories of adjustment. 
 Practitioners’ and policymakers’ concern with specializing in the right thing lies 
behind the popular rankings of regional economies on the basis of their focus on finance, 
information technology, biotechnology, green technology, corporate headquarters and so on.  
These actors are rightly concerned with identifying successful places by virtue of the ‘what’ 
of specialization.  But we have shown that, in many cases, their rankings are based on 
dubious measures; more careful approaches are needed.  This observation applies to more 
syncretic academic concepts of specialization as well, of which we cite two very popular ones 
in recent years: “global cities” and “creative cities” (Sassen, 2001; Florida, 2002).  These 
concepts are at base making claims that regional economic performance is meaningfully a 
function of having a regional economic base that is specialized in activities that are, 
respectively, ‘global’ or ‘creative’; each has spawned cottage industries in which cities are 
                                                
11 Hidalgo et al (2007) is a notable exception. 
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evaluated and ranked along these lines.  Both are about specialization, but both suffer from 
many definitional problems.  The concepts of globalness or creativity (the independent 
variables) mix sectors, labor force characteristics, and sometimes regional environmental 
features (such as “tolerance”).  Moreover, neither has a clear dependent variable, opting for 
composite notions of “economic performance” (Florida, 2002) or globalness (Sassen, 2001).  
The most global cities – New York, London and Tokyo, and many of the rest of the top ten – 
are not the metropolitan areas with the highest per capita incomes.  These wealthiest cities are 
actually mostly B-level globalization centers such as San Francisco, Oslo, Zurich, and 
Vancouver.  The most “creative” metro areas are generally very high income regions, but we 
cannot tell whether this is because of their specialization in certain activities, their 
concentration of certain types of labor, or their environmental characteristics, nor how these 
different factors interact in any putative causal sequence (Storper and Scott, 2009).  One 
could obtain almost identical results to the “creative city” ranking by throwing out the labor 
force and environmental variables, and just ranking on the basis of specialization and wages 
in the tradable sectors; one could equally reverse it and obtain the ratings by using just the 
occupational composition (reflecting specialization, of course).  In other words, neither of 
these analyses seem to add anything that is not done more crisply by simply analyzing the 
specialization of these region’s tradable economies.   
 Finally, we can return to the practical issues of using rankings in economic 
development practice and policymaking.  As long as practitioners continue to believe that by 
shaping regional specialization patterns, they can improve economic development, then 
rankings such as location quotients or other common measures will continue to exist, no 
matter that they remain fairly far away from more academic notions of specialization and its 
dynamics.   
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But even on their own terms, such ranking practices could be vastly improved.  
Rankings and classifications somehow need to artfully mix concepts of relative and absolute 
specialization when they consider a particular set of industries or industry (eg finance, high 
tech, or ‘high wage’ or ‘high skill’ industries), or perhaps include both.  A second lesson is 
that such rankings are basically uninformative if they are not disaggregated to at least the 4-
digit NAICS level.  There will be little or no relation to income effects at higher levels of 
aggregation.  Of course, even that does not fully solve the issues of industrial relatedness or 
similarity that we discuss above. 
 A third and final lesson has to do with the relationship between specialization and 
quantitative growth prospects of regional economies.  As noted, the principal practical tool 
for attempting to estimate these effects is through relative specialization measures such as 
location quotients.  These measures suffer from their lack of a dynamic model of the 
locational structure of the industry in question.  A rise in external demand will not 
automatically benefit a regional economy if the industry’s locational structure is changing 
and the industry is highly contestable across locations.  A good contemporary example of this 
is the logistics industry in Southern California.  The region has a high level of absolute and 
relative specialization in this sector, and a high national location quotient.  But this cannot be 
used to predict anything about quantitative employment changes in the region if the sector’s 
overall economic geography is shifting (new Panama Canal) or if capital is rapidly being 
substituted for labor (e.g.  bigger ships, containers and trucks).  Shift-share analysis can only 
capture this retrospectively, and – cruelly – even when it captures a favorable shift-in-share, it 
cannot simultaneously include the absolute size of the industry at national scale, nor the 
industry’s national employment density and quality.   
This brings us back, once again, to the multidimensional nature of measuring 
specialization and the need to artfully mix the several facets of specialization – absolute, 
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relative, share, and quality – to have any value to applied regional analysis.  Both the 
academics and economic development professionals are in general far from such a high 
standard.  This paper is an attempt to move us one step forward, but many unanswered 
questions remain in order to gain a full understanding of the effects of levels and types of 
specialization on regional economic development.   
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